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Abstract 
As ‘the world’s most successful case of multilateralism’ the European Union has demonstrated 
since its early beginnings a commitment to multilateralism as the preferred form of global 
governance. In particular, it recognized the UN as the apex of the international system, with 
which the EU aspires to cooperate and through which it intends to pursue its policy objectives. 
However, the Union’s engagement with the UN has in practice been fraught with difficulties. The 
EU, as a regional international organization with strong supranational features, has been faced 
with the challenges of multilateral diplomacy in a predominantly state-centric global institution. It 
has so far not only been unable to assume the aspired leadership position, but faces a general 
lack of effectiveness. This paper seeks to provide an overview of the legal basis for EU 
participation at the UN and the various forms that this participation can take. It addresses issues 
of EU internal coordination and external representation at the UN, takes a closer look at the 
practical EU-UN cooperation on the ground and highlights the ensuing challenges and 
opportunities. While the Lisbon reform of the EU external relations architecture has led to 
noticeable improvements in terms of continuity and effectiveness, considerable challenges still 
remain. 
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1. Introduction: The UN as a ‘European Priority’ 
 
As ‘the world’s most successful case of multilateralism’1 the European Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’) 
demonstrated since its early beginnings a commitment to multilateralism as the preferred form 
of global governance.2 Yet, it was only with the European Security Strategy (‘ESS’), adopted by 
the European Council in December 2003, that the EU endorsed its idiosyncratic concept of 
‘effective multilateralism’ as the central guiding principle of its external action.3 Recognising that 
global problems require global solutions, the ESS states that European ‘security and prosperity 
increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system’ and proclaims the ‘development of a 
stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order’ as a European objective.4 Importantly, the ESS highlights the pivotal role of 
the United Nations (‘UN’) in the global multilateral order. Recognising the UN Security Council’s 
(‘UNSC’) ‘primary responsibility’ in the area of international peace and security and the status of 
the UN Charter as the ‘fundamental framework for international relations’, the ESS states that 
‘[s]trengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, 
is a European priority’.5 2003 also saw the publication of a Commission Communication on ‘The 
European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism’6 which set out a general 
strategy for EU-UN cooperation. Again, the Union’s commitment to multilateralism as a ‘defining 
principle’ of its external action was reiterated, as was the importance of the UN as the ‘pivot of 
the multilateral system’.7 EU commitment to multilateralism in general and to the UN as its 
principal forum was taken a step further in the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS.8 
By declaring that ‘Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order’, the Union set itself apart 
from other actors in the multilateral system and took on additional responsibilities, committing 
itself to the aspiration of assuming a leadership role.9 
While EU official statements and policy documents have since then contained an abundance of 
references to the concept of ‘effective multilateralism’,10 it was with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty that the Union’s commitment to multilateralism was considerably strengthened. 
                                               
1 KV Laatikainen and KE Smith (eds), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) 2. 
2 J Wouters, S de Jong and P De Man, ‘The EU’s Commitment to Effective Multilateralism in the Field of Security: 
Theory and Practice’ (2010) 29 Yearbook of European Law 164, 170. 
3 European Council, ‘European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World’, Brussels, 12 December 2003. 
4 Ibid 9. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘The European Union and the 
United Nations: The choice of multilateralism’, COM(2003) 526 final, 10 September 2003. 
7 Ibid 3. 
8 European Council, ‘Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a 
Changing World’, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08. 
9 Ibid 2. 
10 See for an analysis of the ‘effectiveness’ component of the concept Wouters, de Jong and De Man (n 2 above). 
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Through multiple references to the UN and the UN Charter,11 the Treaty on European Union 
(‘TEU’), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) and the accompanying 
Protocols and Declarations elevated the principle of multilateralism to the rank of primary law 
and enshrined the UN framework as the guide and benchmark of EU external action. Of 
particular relevance is Article 3(5) TEU which defines the ‘respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter’ as one of the foreign policy goals of the EU. Article 21 TEU provides additional 
detail, stating that the Union ‘shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in 
particular in the framework of the United Nations’ and affirming the promotion of an ‘international 
system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ as an objective 
of the Union’s foreign policy. Other TEU and TFEU provisions oblige the EU institutions to 
comply with the commitments taken on in the UN system when implementing EU policies, and 
to cooperate with relevant UN bodies.12 
Although the UN, as the paramount institution of multilateral global governance, has been 
recognised as an organisation which the EU seeks to support, with which it aspires to cooperate 
and through which it intends to pursue its policy objectives,13 the Union’s engagement with the 
UN has in practice been fraught with difficulties. The EU, as a regional international organisation 
with strong supranational features, has been faced with the challenges of multilateral diplomacy 
in a predominantly state-centric global institution. The acquisition of participatory rights in 
various UN bodies required an investment of considerable diplomatic and political capital, and 
the implementation of the obtained rights frequently led to additional controversies. Despite its 
considerable economic and political clout, the EU has not – yet – been able to assume a 
leadership role in the UN framework. It frequently finds itself in a minority position, failing not 
only to build cross-regional coalitions but also to garner support among its close allies for its 
positions and initiatives. Among the culprits identified in recent scholarship are a lack of 
cohesion, the unclear division of external competences, as well as the time-consuming and 
inflexible internal coordination process. 
The Lisbon Treaty attempted to remedy some of these shortcomings through extensive 
institutional reforms, including in particular the creation of the office of the multi-hatted High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
European Commission (‘HR/VP’) and the establishment of the European External Action 
Service (‘EEAS’), but also by creating the office of a permanent President of the European 
Council and by limiting the role of the rotating Council Presidency. While the new external 
relations architecture of the EU has led to noticeable improvements in terms of continuity and 
effectiveness of the Union’s engagement with the UN, considerable challenges still remain.  
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the legal basis for EU participation at the UN and 
the various forms that this participation can take. It addresses issues of EU internal coordination 
and external representation at the UN, takes a closer look at the practical EU-UN cooperation 
on the ground, and highlights the ensuing challenges and opportunities. 
                                               
11 TEU arts 3(5), 21(1) and(2)(c), 34(2), 42(1) and (7) TEU, 7th recital of the preamble of the TFEU, TFEU arts 
208(2), 214(7), 220(1), 3rd and 8th recital of the preamble, as well as Art 1(b) of Protocol No 10 on permanent 
structured cooperation, Declaration No 13 concerning CFSP, Declaration No 14 concerning CFSP; cf J Wouters, A-L 
Chané, J Odermatt and T Ramopoulos, ‘Improving the EU’s Status in the UN and the UN System: An Objective 
Without a Strategy?’ in C Kaddous (ed), The European Union in International Organisations and Global Governance 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015). 
12 See eg TFEU arts 208(2), 214(7), 220(1). 
13 Cf the three chapters of the Commission Communication ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The choice 
of multilateralism’ (n 6 above). 
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2. Legal Basis for EU Engagement with the UN 
The status of the EU in the UN and the UN system is determined by both the Union’s internal 
division of powers with the Member States, as incorporated in the TEU and the TFEU, and by 
the constituent treaties (including the UN Charter), resolutions, rules of procedure and other 
instruments that form the legal framework of the UN and the UN system. EU participation is 
conditioned on (1) the existence of a legal instrument (eg resolution, exchange of letters or 
regional economic integration organisation (‘REIO’) clause14) allowing for the participation of the 
EU in (2) a UN body whose mandate falls into an area of EU competence. The legal framework 
of the respective UN body additionally determines the specific arrangement of EU participation 
and the associated rights and duties. 
2.1 EU Legal Framework 
The TFEU devotes a separate title on the ‘Union’s relations with international organisations’.15 
Article 220(1) TFEU provides that the ‘Union shall establish all appropriate forms of cooperation 
with the organs of the United Nations and its specialised agencies’. From the perspective of its 
own constitutional framework, the Union thus has the power and obligation to establish and 
maintain contacts with the UN and the UN system and to participate in their work. Similar 
provisions on cooperation with international organisations exist for a variety of different policy 
areas, eg Article 191(4) TFEU (environment), Article 211 TFEU (development cooperation) and 
Article 212(3) TFEU (economic, financial and technical cooperation). With regard to the 
cooperation with the UN and the UN system, however, Article 220(1) TFEU may be said to 
constitute a lex specialis.16 It should be noted that ‘cooperation’ within the meaning of these 
provisions does not necessarily include the right to obtain or even request membership of a UN 
body, given that this would presuppose the conclusion of an international agreement in 
accordance with the requirements and the procedure of Articles 216 and 218 TFEU.17  
While EU primary law does not contain a provision explicitly granting the Union a general 
competence to acquire membership of an international organisation,18 such a competence is 
widely recognised, based on an opinion of the European Court of Justice (ECJ or Court). In 
Opinion 1/76 the ECJ affirmed the Community’s power to set up an international institution and 
to provide it with decision-making power.19 This reasoning was implicitly confirmed almost two 
decades later in the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94, which dealt with the Communities’ participation in the 
World Trade Organization (‘WTO’), of which the EU is a founding member. As the Court 
                                               
14 EU participation in UN bodies can be governed by a variety of legal instruments, see only UNGA Res 65/276 (3 
May 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/276 granting the EU enhanced observer rights in the UNGA and certain subsidiary 
bodies; Exchange of letters of 21 22 December 1989 between the European Commission and the International 
Labour Organization [1989] OJ C 24/8, renewed by an exchange of letters of 14 May 2001 [2001] OJ C165/23, 
concerning the EU’s observer status in the ILO; or FAO Constitution art II(3) which contains a so-called REIO clause, 
allowing for the membership of an international organisation. 
15 TFEU, Title VI, arts 220–221. 
16 Kirsten Schmalenbach in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV: Das Verfassungsrecht der 
Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta, 4th edn (München, Beck, 2011) TFEU art 211 (fn 3), art 
212 (fn 13); Rudolf Streinz and Tobias Kruis in Rudolf Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV: Vertrag über die Europäische Union 
und Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, 2nd edn (München, Beck, 2012) TFEU art 211 (fn 2), art 
212 (fn 22). 
17 Schmalenbach (n 16 above) art 220 (fn 7); Juliane Kokott in Rudolf Streinz (ed), EUV/AEUV: Vertrag über die 
Europäische Union und Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union, 2nd edn (München, Beck, 2012) 
TFEU art 220 (fn 35). 
18 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2011) 222. 
19 Opinion 1/76 of 26 April 1977 (Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway 
vessels) [1987] ECR 741, para 5; implicitly confirmed by Opinion 1/94 of 15 November 1994 (World Trade 
Organization) [1994] ECR I-5267. 
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expressly recognised the Union’s power to establish a new international organisation, it has 
been concluded a majore ad minus that the EU also has the power to accede to an already 
existing organisation. Membership in an international organisation requires the conclusion of an 
international agreement according to the requirements and procedure outlined in Articles 216 
and 218 TFEU. Article 216(1) TFEU provides that the Union may conclude agreements with 
international organisations in four cases: (1) where the Treaties so provide, (2) where the 
conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve an objective referred to in the 
Treaties, (3) where this is provided for in a legally binding Union act or (4) where this is likely to 
affect common rules or alter their scope.20 While numbers one and three refer to cases in which 
an express competence exists, numbers two and four refer to implied competences. The EU 
may thus conclude international agreements whenever this is necessary to attain a Treaty 
objective, as well as in all those areas where it holds exclusive or shared internal competences. 
As Hoffmeister has stated, ‘[f]rom a legal perspective, the case for a formal status of the 
European Union in multilateral fora is strongest in policy areas subject to exclusive competence 
of the European Community’. 21  But also in those areas of shared EU-Member States 
competences, in which the EU has made extensive use of its competences, a strong argument 
for EU participation in an international organisation can be made. The Union’s membership in 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (‘FAO’) and in the Codex Alimentarius Commission, for 
example, corresponds to the extensive use of its shared competences in the field of agricultural 
policy (Article 4(2)(d) TFEU). Its full participant status in Conferences concerning the issues of 
fisheries and development cooperation are in line with the corresponding shared and ‘parallel’ 
competences provided for in Article 4(2)(d) and 4(4) TFEU. 22 Nevertheless, strong internal 
competences do not necessarily correspond to strong participatory rights. The International 
Labour Organization (‘ILO’) is considered as one of the examples where the Union’s weak 
(observer) status is insufficient to ensure the effective exercise of its wide-reaching 
competences with regard to employment policy. Similarly, the European Commission (not even 
the EU as such) only has observer status in the International Maritime Organization (‘IMO’) and 
the EU only has an ad hoc observer status in the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(‘ICAO’) despite its considerable competences in the field of both maritime and air transport 
(Article 4(2)(g) TFEU) and the extensive use thereof.  
While EU law thus grants the Union the competence to obtain observer or even full member 
status in the UN system, depending on whether the field of activity of a given UN body 
                                               
20 Note that principles 2 and 4 were developed in ECJ case law and only later codified in TFEU art 216(1), see Case 
22/70 Commission v Council (European Agreement on Road Transport) [1971] ECR 263; Opinion 1/76 Draft 
Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels [1977] ECR 741. 
21 F Hoffmeister, ‘Outsider or Frontrunner? Recent Developments Under International and European Law on the 
Status of the European Union in International Organizations and Treaty Bodies’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law 
Review 41, 42; see also M Emerson, R Balfour, T Corthaut, J Wouters, P Kaczynski and T Renard, ‘Upgrading the 
EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy’, Centre for European 
Policy Studies (CEPS), Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, European Policy Centre (EPC), 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, 2011, p 4; and J Wouters, J Odermatt and T 
Ramopoulos, ‘The EU in the World of International Organizations: Diplomatic Aspirations, Legal Hurdles and Political 
Realities’ in M Smith, S Keukeleire and S Vanhoonacker (eds), The Diplomatic System of the European Union: 
Evolution, Change and Challenges (London, Routledge, 2015). 
22 See for example the EU’s full participant status at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (‘Rio 
Conference’), the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 World Summit for Social 
Development, the 2001 Third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries, the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development or the 1995 UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: J 
Wouters, F Hoffmeister and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger 
Partnership (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2006) annex.  
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corresponds to the Union’s internal division of competences with its Member States, the actual 
acquisition of such a status depends on the institutional framework of the respective UN forum.  
2.2 UN Legal Framework 
The UN legal framework is the second decisive factor which determines the possibility and 
extent of EU engagement in the organisation. The UN remains a predominantly state-oriented 
institution, and therefore a challenging environment for EU foreign policy and diplomacy. Only a 
small minority of UN bodies allow other international organisations to join as full members. The 
vast majority either limit their participation to narrow observer rights or exclude any formal 
participation at all. In line with its commitment to effective multilateralism and in order to 
safeguard the exercise of its competences at the international level, the Union has continuously 
sought to ensure a strong presence in the UN. In its 2003 Communication ‘The European Union 
and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism’, the Commission declared that the 
Community ‘should be given the possibility to participate fully in the work of UN bodies where 
matters of Community competence are concerned, and Member States should contribute 
effectively towards this’.23 Full membership was regarded as the preferred status and ultimate 
goal. However, in reality the EU’s efforts for status enhancement have only yielded slow and 
partial successes, and have met considerable obstacles, both external and with the EU’s own 
Member States. European Commission President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton proposed 
a far less ambitious policy in their 2012 ‘Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU 
status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of 
Lisbon’.24 While this strategy still held onto the aim of an ‘improvement of the EU status and its 
alignment with the objectives of the EU Treaties’, it avoided any endorsement of concrete 
negotiation goals.25 So far, as far as the UN system is concerned, the EU only holds member 
status in the FAO and in the Codex Alimentarius Commission. It has observer status in most UN 
bodies, and acquired enhanced participation rights in the UNGA in 2011. In a number of bodies 
the EU is nevertheless still not formally represented, most importantly in the UNSC. 
2.2.1 Member Status 
Article 4(1) UN Charter, which states that ‘[m]embership in the United Nations is open to all 
other peace-loving states’ (emphasis added) is generally understood to limit membership in the 
main organisation to states only, thereby prohibiting the accession of other international actors, 
such as the EU.26 However, it does obviously not bar the multitude of bodies and fora in the UN 
system from including provisions in their respective governing instruments which allow for 
membership. 
The FAO was the first and is so far the only UN Specialised Agency that has amended its 
Constitution in order to allow for the accession of the EU (then still the European Economic 
Community, EEC). In light of the EEC’s wide-reaching agricultural competences, first contacts 
between both organisations were established as early as the 1950s. 27 The EEC started to 
participate as an observer in the meetings of the FAO, acquired enhanced participation rights in 
1970 and finally obtained membership status in 1991, after the FAO Conference had amended 
                                               
23 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The European Union and the 
United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 final, 23. 
24 Communication to the Commission from the President in Agreement with Vice-President Ashton – Strategy for the 
progressive improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, C(2012) 9420 final, 20 December 2012, on file with the authors. 
25 See for a detailed analysis of the Barroso-Ashton Strategy, Wouters, Chané, Odermatt and Ramopoulos (n 11 
above). 
26 Hoffmeister (n 21 above) 41. 
27 Wouters, Chané, Odermatt and Ramopoulos (n 11 above). 
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the FAO Constitution to include a REIO clause.28 As a ‘Member Organization’,29 the EU enjoys 
largely the same participation rights as Member States, including the right to submit proposals 
and to vote. Nevertheless, there remain a few important exceptions, which render its status 
inferior to that held by states. In particular, the EU does not have the right to participate in 
certain restricted committees30 and the committees responsible for the internal working of the 
conference; it does not have voting rights for elective places31 and budget matters;32 and it may 
not hold office in the Conference, the Council and their subsidiary bodies.33 
In 2003 the EC also gained member status in the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a subsidiary 
body of the FAO and the World Health Organization (‘WHO’). The Union’s participation rights 
there are even weaker than in the FAO, given that the determination of a quorum, and thereby 
the Union’s voting power, depends on the number of EU Member States which are present.34 
The EU may therefore not vote on behalf of all its Member States but only on behalf of those 
which attend the session. As Hoffmeister has noted, this is a ‘legally unsatisfactory arrangement 
… because Member States vested competence in the Community by concluding the EC Treaty: 
they d not grant ad hoc “empowerments” through their presence’.35 
Although the 1991 amendment of the FAO Constitution was at that time expected to prompt 
other UN bodies to follow suit, so far there have been no similar developments in the UN 
framework, with the exception of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (infra).  
2.2.2 Observer Status 
The EU has observer status in a considerable number of UN bodies. Among them are the 
UNGA36 and its programmes and funds, the Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’) and its 
functional and regional commissions, 37 specialised agencies, such as the ILO, 38 the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (‘UNESCO’), the WHO, as well as 
other bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (‘IAEA’).39 While the participation 
rights of observers can vary, they usually include the right to attend (formal) meetings and the 
right to speak. They generally exclude the right to vote, to raise points of order and to submit 
candidates. Observers are usually seated apart from the Member States. They may typically 
speak only after all the Member States have spoken and are allocated shorter speaking time 
slots than the Member States.40  
                                               
28 Ibid. 
29 FAO Constitution art II(3). 
30 Programme Committee, Finance Committee, Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters, FAO Constitution art 
II(9), FAO General Rules, r XLVI. 
31 FAO General Rules, r XLV(2). 
32 FAO Constitution art XVIII(6). 
33 FAO Constitution art II(9); FAO General Rules, rr XLIII(3), XLIV. 
34 Rules of Procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, r II(8). 
35 Hoffmeister (n 21 above) 44. 
36 The EU has held observer status in the UNGA since 1974, see UNGA Res 3208 (XXIX) (11 October 1974). 
37 With regard to the regional commissions the Union’s observer status is subject to invitation, Wouters, Hoffmeister 
and Ruys (n 22 above) 403. 
38 Exchange of letters of 21 and 22 December 1989 between the European Commission and the International Labour 
Organization [1989] OJ C24/8, renewed by an exchange of letters of 14 May 2001 [2001] OJ C165/23. 
39 Wouters, Hoffmeister and Ruys (n 22 above) annex. 
40 Cf the speaking time arrangements of the HRC, where observers are allocated 1-2 minutes less speaking time 
than Member States, depending on the type of discussion, HRC, ‘Information note for ease of reference on speaking 
time arrangements’, 24th session, 9–27 September 2013. 
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Given that these limited participation rights may conflict with the Union’s effective exercise of 
those competences that have been conferred on it by its Member States, the EU has sought to 
improve its observer status by turning it into a full membership or by enhancing it with additional 
rights. One of the most notable examples is the 2011 ‘upgrade’ of the Union’s observer status in 
the UNGA, which aimed to align the Union’s representation in the UNGA with its changed 
system of external representation after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In particular, the 
EU sought the opportunity to participate in its own right instead of having to rely on the rotating 
Council Presidency. A first draft resolution was introduced in the UNGA in September 2010 but 
it failed to be adopted.41 Even some of the Union’s traditional allies, such as Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand, did not support the Union’s proposal, thus contributing to the EU’s ‘shambolic 
defeat’.42 After increased outreach and substantive amendments, UNGA Resolution 65/276 was 
eventually adopted on 3 May 2011. Although the final Resolution had been watered down, the 
EU achieved its core goal, the right to be represented through its own officials. Its enhanced 
participation rights include: 
1. To be inscribed on the list of speakers among representatives of major groups, in 
order to make interventions; 
2. To participate in the general debate of the UNGA; 
3. To have its relevant communications circulated directly, and without intermediary, as 
documents of the Assembly, meeting or conference; 
4. To present proposals and amendments orally; 
5. To exercise the right of reply.43 
The EU explicitly does not have the right to vote, to co-sponsor draft resolutions or decisions, or 
to submit candidates.44 
The practical implementation of these rights subsequently entailed considerable and 
unexpected difficulties. 45  Some UN Member States, most vocally the CARICOM group, 
advocated a narrow interpretation of UNGA Resolution 65/276, fearing an erosion of the 
intergovernmental character of the body and the principle of sovereign equality of the UN 
Member States. In particular the right ‘to be inscribed on the list of speakers among 
representatives of major groups’ (emphasis added) triggered controversies about whether major 
groups represented by states should take preference. Another dispute focused on the right to 
deliver an explanation of vote, which some considered to be only assigned to those actors that 
                                               
41 The Union’s diplomatic debacle around its UNGA status upgrade has received considerable scholarly attention, 
see for example E Brewer, ‘The Participation of the European Union in the Work of the United Nations: Evolving to 
Reflect the New Realities of Regional Organizations’ (2012) 9 International Organizations Law Review 181; G De 
Baere and E Paasivirta, ‘Identity and Difference: The EU and the UN as Part of Each Other’ in H De Waele and J-J 
Kuipers (eds), The Emergence of the European Union’s International Identity – Views from the Global Arena (Leiden, 
Brill, 2013) 21–42; J Wouters, J Odermatt and T Ramopoulos, ‘The Status of the European Union at the United 
Nations General Assembly’ in I Govaere, E Lannon, P Van Elsuwege and S Adam (eds), The European Union in the 
World: Liber Amicorum Professor Marc Maresceau (Leiden, Brill, 2014) 211–23. 
42 Paul Luif, quoted in Judy Dempsey, ‘For Europe, a Challenge to Make Its Voice Resonate’ (The New York Times, 
13 October 2010): www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/world/europe/14iht-letter.html?_r=3&, accessed 24 June 2014. 
43 UNGA Res 65/276 (3 May 2011) UN Doc A/RES/65/276 para 1. 
44 Ibid, annex para 3. 
45 See for more detail Wouters, Chané, Odermatt and Ramopoulos (n 11 above). 
11 
 
also had a right to vote. Most of those issues have been resolved in subsequent sessions.46 
Nevertheless, the realisation that the successful implementation of formally obtained rights 
cannot be taken for granted prompted President Barroso and Vice-President Ashton to call for 
continued efforts to ensure the full implementation of the Resolution.47 
2.2.3. No Formal Status 
The UN Security Council (‘UNSC’) is one of the few UN bodies in which the EU holds no formal 
status. Instead, the EU has to rely on those of its Member States that have either a permanent 
seat (France and the United Kingdom) or have been elected as temporary Council members (on 
average two other EU Member States).48 Aiming to safeguard EU representation even in the 
absence of formal presence, Article 34(2) TEU provides that the EU Member States have the 
duty to represent the positions and the interests of the Union.49 The Treaty also strengthened 
the role of the HR/VP in the UNSC, obliging Member States to request that the HR/VP be 
invited to a meeting whenever a Union position on a UNSC agenda item exists.50 Even in the 
absence of membership or observer status, the HR/VP – in most cases, the EU Ambassador – 
has regularly been able to represent the EU’s position in the UNSC.51 Nevertheless, there is still 
no ‘strong collective EU presence’ in the UNSC.52 Proposals for a single EU seat on the UNSC 
have so far not found sufficient political support to present a realistic alternative. While they 
have been endorsed by various EU institutions and actors, in particular the EP, the former High 
Representative Javier Solana and the former Commissioner for External Relations and the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the United Kingdom and France have 
been concerned to maintain their strong position at the UNSC.53 
Similarly, the EU nor the Eurozone hold formal status in the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). 
Despite the Union’s wide-ranging exclusive and shared competences on matters covered by the 
mandate of the IMF (with regard to those EU Member States that are also members of the 
Eurozone), it has to rely on representation through its Member States. Against this background, 
and in line with Article 138(2) TFEU the Commission presented a proposal for a Council 
Decision aiming to establish unified representation of the Eurozone in the IMF in October 
2015. 54  The proposal foresees a number of steps in order to align the Union’s internal 
competences with its participation rights, including the attainment of observer rights for the 
Eurozone and the strengthening of the internal coordination process. 
                                               
46 J Wouters and others, ‘Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service: Achievements, 
Challenges and Opportunities’, Study for the European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the 
Union, EXPO/B/AFET/2012/07, February 2013, p 79. 
47 Communication to the Commission from the President in Agreement with Vice-President Ashton – Strategy for the 
progressive improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, C(2012) 9420 final, 20 December 2012. 
48 S Gstoehl, ‘“Patchwork Power” Europe: The EU’s Representation in International Institutions’ (2009) 14 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 385, 400. 
49 TEU art 34(2). 
50 Ibid. 
51 See for a list of statements: European Union Delegation to the United Nations – New York, ‘EU Statements at the 
UN Security Council’: http://eu-un.europa.eu/security-council/, accessed 5 May 2016. 
52 S Blavoukos and D Bourantonis, ‘The EU’s Performance in the United Nations Security Council’ (2011) 33 Journal 
of European Integration 731, 733. 
53 Ibid 737 et seq. 
54  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Decision laying down measures in view of progressively 
establishing unified representation of the euro area in the International Monetary Fund’, 21 October 2015, 
COM(2015) 603 final. 
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3. External Representation and Internal Coordination 
As a Union of 28 Member States the EU requires sophisticated internal coordination 
mechanisms in order to ensure that all EU and Member States representatives at the UN ‘speak 
with one voice’. In addition, a complex framework of Treaty provisions and internal 
arrangements governs the external representation of the EU in the various UN bodies. 
3.1 External Representation 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the external representation of the Union was 
ensured by the European Commission concerning ‘first pillar’ (ie Community) issues, and by the 
Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency concerning all other issues. The 
advantage of this solution was that the Council Presidency as a UN Member State easily fitted 
within the state-centric structure of the UN. It could smoothly and prominently deliver 
presidential statements for the EU in speaking slots reserved for states, circulate documents 
and negotiate with third countries. The downside was, however, a lack of stability due to the six-
monthly rotation. Third states criticised the lack of transparency of the external representation, 
due to the ever changing ‘hats’. Moreover, logistical issues ensued and EU representation 
appeared chaotic when Commission and Presidency representatives had to switch seats during 
meetings depending on the agenda item.55 
The Lisbon Treaty not only abolished the three-pillar structure of the EU, it also sought to 
increase the coherence and unity of the Union’s external representation through a series of 
institutional reforms. In areas of EU competence – which includes the CFSP as a special 
competence as well as non-CFSP matters where the Union has exclusive competence or 
exercised its shared competences – the Union is now solely represented through its own 
officials. Depending on the subject-matter and on the level of the meeting, the responsibility for 
the Union’s external representation falls either upon the Commission, the President of the 
European Council, the HR/VP or the EEAS. Member States remain competent to conduct their 
own foreign policy, albeit in line with the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU). 
Their competences comprise both areas in which no powers have been conferred to the EU, as 
well as those areas of shared EU-Member States competences where the EU has not exercised 
its competences. Whenever an issue falls within both an area of EU and of national 
competence, the responsible representative will be determined based on whether or not the 
‘thrust’56 or the ‘preponderance’57 of the issue lies within an area of EU competence. 
                                               
55 De Baere and Paasivirta (n 41 above) 25. 
56 Cf Arrangement concerning preparation for the meetings of the FAO as well as interventions and voting, 18 
December 1991, unpublished, reproduced in R Frid, The Relations between the EC and international organizations – 
Legal Theory and Practice (The Hague, Kluwer, 1995) annex VI, art 2.3. The 1991 Arrangement was updated in 1992 
and 1995. In 2013 the Commission proposed to revise the existing Arrangements. The Draft Arrangement provides 
that an ‘entrusted Member State’ will deliver common statements whenever the ‘common position primarily contains 
elements not covered by an EU position’, the assessment of which will be based on ‘the main expected impact of the 
policy pursued within the FAO on the EU or on its Member States’, COM(2013) 333 final, annex 2, para 3.3. This 
proposal was met with criticism in the Council, where a majority of delegations opted for maintaining the current 
division of competences, Presidency Non-Paper, Doc No 5337/14. 
57 Cf Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission on the UNESCO negotiations 
on the draft Convention on the protection of the diversity of cultural contents and artistic expressions, Doc No 
5768/05, para 3; Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission for the participation 
of the Community and its Member States in meetings regarding the implementation of the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Doc No 5914/07, para 4; Code of Conduct 
between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the 
implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities [2010] OJ C340/11, art 8. 
13 
 
The Commission represents the Union in all areas of EU competence that do not fall under the 
CFSP, 58 with the President of the Commission assuming the role of EU representative at 
summit level.59 Concerning issues that fall under the CFSP, the tasks of external representation 
are divided between the HR/VP and the President of the European Council.60 The latter only 
plays a limited role in this context. As Article 15(6) TEU provides, the President of the European 
Council ensures the external representation ‘at his level and in that capacity’ and ‘without 
prejudice to the powers of the High Representative’. His tasks are therefore mainly reduced to 
representing the Union at the level of Heads of State or Government, for example during the 
‘High Level’ General Debate at the beginning of each year’s ordinary session of the UNGA.61 
The HR/VP on the other hand bears the main responsibility of conducting the CFSP. This 
includes not only the responsibility to drive forward the development of this policy, but also to 
lead the political dialogue with third countries and to represent the Union in international 
organisations and at international conferences. Nevertheless, the division of work between the 
President of the European Council and the HR/VP is not clearly determined.62 Article 15(6) TEU 
deliberately contains a vague formulation. The respective roles will therefore be flexibly shaped 
through both cooperation and coordination, but potentially also through power plays and turf 
battles between the respective office-holders. The Union Delegations are responsible for the 
representation of the Union at the UN. 63  EU Delegations to UN bodies exist in Geneva 
(established in 1961), New York (1964), Paris (1964), Nairobi (1976), Vienna (1979) and Rome 
(1993).64 They cover CFSP and non-CFSP matters65 and lend assistance to the HR/VP, the 
President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission at 
the summit level as well as in other settings.66 The EEAS also supports and cooperates with the 
diplomatic services of the EU Member States in order to ensure the consistency of the Union’s 
external action.67 The EU Member States are lastly responsible for representing Union positions 
whenever the EU’s participatory rights are weak.68 While the rotating Council Presidency lost its 
                                               
58 TEU art 17(1), which also makes exception for ‘other cases provided for in the Treaties’, by which external 
representation in monetary matters seems to be meant.  
59 S Gstoehl, ‘EU Diplomacy After Lisbon: More Effective Multilateralism?’ (2011) 17 Brown Journal of World Affairs 
181, 186. 
60 TEU arts 15(6), 27(2). 
61 G Edwards, ‘The EU’s foreign policy and the search for effect’ (2013) 27 International Relations 276, 281; Gstoehl 
(n 59 above) 186; the President of the European Union has addressed the UNGA during each session since 2011, cf 
‘Address by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, 66th United Nations General Assembly 
General Debate’, New York, 22 September 2011: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124714.pdf; ‘Herman Van Rompuy, President of 
the European Council, Address to the 67th General Assembly of the United Nations’, New York, 26 September 2012: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/132612.pdf; ‘Herman Van Rompuy, President of 
the European Council, Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations’, New York, 25 September 2013: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/138823.pdf, all accessed 25 June 2014. 
62 X Jin and M O Hosli, ‘Pre- and Post-Lisbon: European Union Voting in the United Nations General Assembly’ 
(2013) 36 West European Politics 1274, 1278. 
63 TFEU art 221(1). 
64 E Drieskens, ‘What’s in a Name? Challenges to the Creation of EU Delegations’ (2012) 7 The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy 51, 53. 
65 Gstoehl (n 59 above) 186. 
66 Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service [2010] OJ L201/30, art 2. 
67 Ibid art 3(1). 
68 Cf ECJ, Opinion 2/91 of 19 March 1993 (Internation Labour Organization) [1993] ECR I-1061 para 5; ECJ, Case C-
45/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-701 para 31.  
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formal role as an external representative of the Union under the Lisbon Treaty, it is in practice 
still frequently relied upon to speak ‘on behalf of the EU’.69  
3.2 Internal Coordination 
Internal coordination of the Union’s positions in UN fora serves a variety of purposes, all of 
which contribute to the larger goal of increasing the effectiveness and the impact of the external 
action of the EU. Primarily, coordination between the various EU Member States and EU 
institutions is necessary to ensure that all actors ‘speak with one voice’ and vote consistently. 
Secondly, in those fora where the EU has no official status, coordination takes place in order to 
ensure that the positions taken by Member States are not only consistent, but also in line with 
existing EU positions. In addition, whenever both the EU and its Member States have member 
status in a UN body (‘mixity’), coordination is necessary to determine who will exercise the 
voting and speaking rights with regard to each individual agenda item.70 
Article 4(3) TEU commits the EU Member States to the principle of sincere cooperation, which, 
as one of the fundamental principles of EU law, permeates all policy areas and all state 
functions. In the area of external action, it binds the Member States to refrain from any act that 
might weaken the negotiating position of the Union.71 In the area of CFSP, Article 24(3) TEU 
provides more specifically that the ‘Member States shall support the Union’s external and 
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall 
comply with the Union’s action in this area’. The commitment to a coherent Union policy limits 
the freedom of the EU Member States to take unilateral action and presupposes some degree 
of internal coordination. This duty of coordination is elevated to a legal obligation through Article 
34(1) TEU, which states that ‘Member States shall coordinate their action in international 
organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the Union’s positions in such 
forums’. With regard to the UNSC, where the EU has no formal status and not all EU Member 
States are present, Article 34(2) TEU obliges the participating Member States to ‘concert’, to 
‘defend the positions and the interests of the Union’ and to keep the other EU Member States 
and the HR/VP ‘fully informed’.  
In practice these legal obligations are translated into a complex coordination process, spread 
over multiple venues, bodies and channels. Generally, the process can be divided into the 
formulation of the general strategies in Brussels, and the fine-tuning of those positions on the 
ground in New York, Geneva, Rome or other meeting places of UN bodies. In Brussels, the 
Council of the European Union develops the priorities and positions of the Union at the UN. It is 
assisted by the Political and Security Committee (‘PSC’), which serves as the main contact point 
for the EU Delegation in New York with regard to CFSP and CSDP issues.72 Nevertheless, by 
far the largest part of the work is done in the Council’s multiple working groups and committees, 
many of which have direct relevance for EU participation in the UN.73 Of primary importance is 
the United Nations Working Party (‘CONUN’) whose responsibilities include, among others, 
                                               
69 See only the HRC, where the rotating Council Presidency still frequently speaks on behalf of the EU: J Wouters 
and K Meuwissen, ‘The European Union at the UN Human Rights Council: Multilateral Human Rights Protection 
Coming of Age?’ (2014) 2 European Journal of Human Rights 135, 161. 
70 In case of mixity, member rights can generally only be exercised on an alternative basis by either the EU or its 
Member States, see eg FAO Constitution art II(8). 
71  Wolfgang Kahl in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV: Das Verfassungsrecht der 
Europäischen Union mit Europaeischer Grundrechtecharta, 4th edn (München, Beck, 2011) TEU art 4 (fn 100). 
72  MB Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The Functioning and Coherence of EU External 
Representation in a State-centric Environment (Leiden, Brill, 2008) 126. 
73 Degrand-Guillaud estimates that approximately 70% of Council texts are agreed in working groups, A Degrand-
Guillaud, ‘Actors and Mechanisms of EU Coordination at the UN’ (2009) 14 European Foreign Affairs Review 405, 
416. 
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monitoring the work of the UN, coordinating candidatures for high-level UN posts and leading 
the coordination process with regard to UN conferences.74 CONUN plays a ‘supervising role’75 
with regard to UN matters dealt with by the various thematic and geographic Council working 
parties. For example, several working parties under the Agriculture and Fisheries Council 
(‘AGRI’) deal with the Union’s participation in the FAO76 and the Working Party on International 
Environment Issues coordinates the Union’s policy with regard to negotiations taking place in 
the United Nations Environment Programme (‘UNEP’) and the High-level Political Forum on 
Sustainable Development. The Union’s human rights policy at the UN – in particular at the 
UNGA’s Third Committee and the Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) – falls under the responsibility 
of the Working Party on Human Rights (‘COHOM’), whereas issues of development 
cooperation, disarmament and arms control are dealt with in the Working Party on Development 
Cooperation and in the Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control, respectively. 
Usually working parties meet no more than once per month, generally in a closed setting, 
convening delegates from the 28 Member States’ capitals. Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the chairmanship of many of the Council’s preparatory bodies has been taken 
over by EEAS officials, thereby replacing the six-monthly rotating Presidency.77 
The strategies developed in Brussels require further refinement through ‘on the ground’ 
negotiations at the various UN bodies. As with the chairmanship of many Council working 
parties, the EEAS has succeeded the rotating Council Presidency as the leader of the local 
coordination process. EU Delegations accredited to multilateral organisations, including the UN 
organisations in Geneva, Paris, Nairobi, New York, Rome, and Vienna, were supposed to 
‘assume as soon as possible the role and functions … performed by the rotating Presidency in 
terms of local coordination’78 upon the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which presented 
them with no small challenge in terms of expertise and manpower. 79  An estimated 1300 
coordination meetings are held in New York each year, another 1000 meetings in Geneva.80  
It is the task of the HR/VP to ensure coherence between the CFSP and the non-CFSP areas of 
EU external action at the UN (Articles 18(4) and 21(3) TEU). Commentators initiallynoticed the 
HR/VP’s ‘lop-sided persona’ 81  with its extensive competences in the field of CFSP and 
considerably lesser powers as a member of the Commission.This situation has changed under 
the Juncker Commission, which saw a revival of the Commissioners’ Group on External Action 
(‘CGEA’) chaired by the HR/VP,82 and a generally higher degree of cohesiveness of the HR/VPs  
multiple ‘hats’.83  .  
                                               
74 Rasch (n 72 above) 130; Degrand-Guillaud (n 73 above) 416. 
75 Rasch (n 72 above) 130. 
76 In particular the Coordination Working Party, the Codex Alimentarius Working Party, the Working Party on External 
Fisheries Policy and the Working Party on Forestry. 
77 Council Decision 2009/908/EU of 1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the European 
Council Decision on the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of 
the Council [2009] OJ L322/28. 
78 Council of the European Union, ‘Presidency report to the European Council on the European External Action 
Service’ (14930/09) 23 October 2009, para 31. 
79 See for more detail Wouters and others (n 46 above) 77. 
80 Gstoehl (n 59 above) 183. 
81 S Blockmans and M Spernbauer, ‘Legal Obstacles to Comprehensive EU External Security Action’ (2013) 18 
European Foreign Affairs Review 7, 13. 
82  A Rettman, ‘EU commission creates new foreign policy cell’, EU Observer, 11 September 2014, 
https://euobserver.com/institutional/125567, accessed 5 May 2016. 
83 S Blockmans and S Russack, ‘The Commissioners’ Group on External Action – Key political facilitator’, CEPS 
Special Report No 125, December 2015. 
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4. EU-UN Cooperation on the Ground 
Any analysis of EU-UN relations would be incomplete if it focused only on the institutional 
aspects of the partnership and ignored the actual practical cooperation between both 
organisations. Whereas the former remains fraught with difficulties, the latter is generally 
perceived more favourably. Recent years have witnessed increasing consultations between the 
UN and the EU, as evidenced through the conclusion of numerous strategic partnerships, 
memoranda of understanding and other agreements which aim to make the cooperation 
between both bodies more strategic and efficient.84 The dialogue between EU and UN actors 
has intensified with frequent meetings between high-level officials of both organisations. Today, 
the UN operates 26 liaison offices in Brussels, while six EU Delegations represent the Union in 
the major UN bodies.  
EU-UN cooperation has been assigned particular importance by EU primary law in the areas of 
development cooperation, humanitarian aid and peace-keeping/conflict prevention. In the area 
of development cooperation, Article 208(2) TFEU commits the Union and its Member States to 
‘comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the 
context of the United Nations and other competent international organisations’, thereby not only 
presupposing a collaboration between the EU and the UN in the field of development aid, but 
also creating a legal obligation to adhere to those commitments and objectives that fall 
otherwise in the category of ‘soft law’.85 Article 214(7) TFEU goes even further, stipulating that 
the ‘Union shall ensure that its humanitarian aid operations are coordinated and consistent with 
those of international organisations and bodies, in particular those forming part of the United 
Nations system’, thereby creating a legal obligation to achieve coherence between EU and UN 
actions. Finally, Article 42(1) TEU enshrines the status of the UN Charter as the guiding legal 
framework for EU missions in the areas of peace-keeping, conflict prevention and international 
security. 
The EU holds the top rank among the world’s biggest development aid donors.86 Together with 
its Member States it accounts for more than 50 per cent of the total official development 
assistance. Part of these funds is channelled through the various UN organisations which are 
active in the area of development cooperation, among them most importantly the FAO and the 
UN Development Programme (‘UNDP’). Cooperation between the EU and the FAO is 
particularly close, as evidenced by the fact that the FAO is the only UN agency that granted the 
EU membership status. The FAO and EU concluded a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 
2004, aiming to further increase their strategic cooperation in selected policy areas.87 While the 
EU does not contribute to the FAO’s regular budget, it has developed into the organisation’s 
largest extra-budgetary donor through its voluntary contributions, currently funding over 150 
                                               
84 Eg Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a strategic partnership between the European 
Commission and the United Nations Development Programme, 28 June 2004; Memorandum of Understanding 
between the European Union and the United Nations entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women 
(UN Women), 16 April 2012; Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a partnership between 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Secretariat and its subsidiary bodies and the 
European Union, 8 October 2012;the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European 
Community, represented by the Commission of the European Communities and the United Nations (‘FAFA’), 29 April 
2003, and Addendum No 1, 21–26 February 2014. 
85 Streinz and Kruis (n 16 above) TFEU art 208 fn 37. 
86  European Commission, ‘EU Official Development Assistance reaches highest-ever share of Gross National 
Income’, 13 April 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1362_en.htm?locale=en, accessed 5 May 2016. 
87  European Commission/FAO, ‘Memorandum of Understanding concerning the establishment of a Strategic 
Partnership between the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Commission of the 
European Communities in the field of development and humanitarian affairs’, 13 September 2004. 
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FAO projects world-wide.88 Going beyond EU-FAO cooperation, the EU furthermore concluded 
a ‘Strategic Programmatic Framework on Food Security and Nutrition’, bringing together the 
three Rome-based agencies, FAO, World Food Programme (‘WFP’) and International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (‘IFAD’) in June 2011, aiming ‘to harmonize and coordinate the 
implementation of … food security and humanitarian food assistance goals’. 89  The top 
beneficiary of the financial contributions of EuropeAid to the UN is, however, the UNDP,90 with 
whom the EU has cooperated for the past 15 years.91 As with the FAO, the EU sealed its 
cooperation with the UNDP through the conclusion of a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 
2004,92 which was again endorsed by UNDP Administrator Clark and EU Commissioner for 
Development Piebalgs in a joint statement in 2012. 93 Other UN institutions working in the 
development field that rank among the main beneficiaries of EU funding are the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (‘UNICEF’) and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (‘UNRWA’).94  
The EU is equally active in the field of humanitarian aid and has endorsed the ‘central and 
overall coordinating role of the United Nations, particularly the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in promoting a coherent international response to humanitarian 
crises’.95 In line with this commitment and the obligation of Article 214(7) TFEU, the EU strives 
to closely cooperate with the UN’s humanitarian aid organisations, in particular OCHA, the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’), the WHO and UNICEF. Notably, between July 
2013 and June 2014 the EU held for the first time the chairmanship of the OCHA Donor Support 
Group (‘ODSG’),96 an informal forum which acts as a ‘“sounding board” and a source of advice 
on policy, management, budgetary and financial questions’.97 As with OCHA, the EU and its 
Member States are among the top donors in UNHCR.98 The EU and UNHCR cooperate not only 
                                               
88 FAO Technical Cooperation Department, Field Programme Management Information System (FPMIS), ‘List of EU-
Funded Projects’: https://extranet.fao.org/fpmis/FPMISReportServlet.jsp?type=PRJ_EU, accessed 5 May 2016. 
89 European Commission/Rome based United Nations Agencies, Statement of Intent: Programmatic Cooperation on 
Food Security and Nutrition, 27 June 2011. 
90  See European Commission, ‘EuropeAid Financial Contributions to the United Nations - 2014-2014’: 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/europeaid-un-statistics-for-2014_en.pdf, accessed 5 May 2016. 
91  UNDP Representation Office in Brussels, ‘UNDP and the European Union’: 
www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/partnerships_initiatives/overview/, accessed 26 June 2014. 
92 See above n 84. 
93 UNDP, ‘Joint Statement by EU Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and UNDP Administrator Helen Clark’, 8 May 2012: 
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2012/05/08/joint-statement-by-eu-commissioner-andris-
piebalgs-and-undp-administrator-helen-clark/, accessed 26 June 2014. 
94 See above n 90. 
95 Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within 
the Council, the European Parliament and the European Commission, ‘The European Consensus on Humanitarian 
Aid’ (2008/C 25/01) para 25. 
96 Permanent delegation of the European Union to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva, 
‘EU takes chairmanship of OCHA Donor Support Group (17/07/2013)’: 
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/ocha_donor_support_group_en.htm, 
accessed 26 June 2014. 
97 OCHA, ‘How OCHA is funded’: www.unocha.org/about-us/ocha-funded, accessed 26 June 2014. 
98  OCHA, ‘OCHA Donor Ranking’: https://oct.unocha.org/mobile/Donor/DonorRanking, accessed 5 May 2016; 
Permanent delegation of the European Union to the UN Office and other international organisations in Geneva, 
‘Working with UNHCR’: 
eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un_geneva/eu_un_geneva/humanitarian_affairs/unhcr/index_en.htm, accessed 26 June 
2014. 
18 
 
on matters outside of the Union’s borders but have also worked on setting up a Common 
European Asylum System (‘CEAS’).99 
In 2003, the EU and the UN concluded a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement 
(‘FAFA’),100 which turns the requirements of the Union’s Financial Regulation101 into contractual 
obligations for funding agreements between both organisations. 102  The FAFA governs the 
procedural side of EU contributions to the UN, including reporting requirements and issues of 
visibility. It provides a uniform set of rules for a large number of EU-UN projects103 and is 
intended to increase the efficiency of the cooperation.104 In light of concerns about a lack of 
visibility of EU contributions to UN projects, the European Commission and the UN additionally 
agreed on a Joint Action Plan on Visibility in 2006.105 The Action Plan aims to ensure the 
implementation of the visibility provisions included in the FAFA in order to ‘communicate the 
positive results of [EU-UN] partnership more effectively to beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders’.106  
Lastly, peace-keeping, conflict prevention and international security are among those policy 
areas where EU-UN cooperation has gained particular momentum in the past decade. EU-UN 
partnership in the field was prominently affirmed by the 2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU 
Cooperation in Crisis Management, which established a joint consultative mechanism – the 
Steering Committee – in order to strengthen the inter-institutional cooperation in the areas of 
planning, training, communication and best-practices.107 As indicated before, the ESS, adopted 
by the European Council only a few months later, recognised the supremacy of the UNSC for 
the maintenance of international peace and security and placed EU operations within the legal 
framework of the UN Charter.108 Since then, the Union has participated in an increasing number 
of military and police operations, maintaining a geographical focus on Europe and Africa. While 
the 28 EU Member States today contribute more than two-fifths of the UN peacekeeping 
operations,109 EU military personnel (including police, observers and troops) only amount to 5 
                                               
99  See for more detail European Commission, ‘Common European Asylum System’: ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm, accessed 26 June 2014. 
100 Above, n 84. 
101 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the 
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
1605/2002 [2012] OJ L298/1. 
102 European Court of Auditors, ‘The Efficiency and Effectiveness of EU Contributions Channelled Through United 
Nations Organisations in Conflict-Affected Countries’, Special Report No 3, 2011, p 10. 
103 In particular it applies to the UN bodies listed in fn 1 of the FAFA, as well as to those bodies that individually 
acceded in line with art 15.3 of the FAFA, namely CTBTO, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IFAD, ILO, ITU, UNCDF, UNESCO, 
UNIDO, UNOPS, UN-Women, WHO and WMO, see: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/un-specialised-agencies-
covered-financial-and-administrative-framework-agreement_en, accessed 5 May 2016. On the EU side, the FAFA 
applies to the Commission, as well as to the European Agency for Reconstruction in Kosovo, Euratom and the 
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per cent of the personnel deployed in all UN peacekeeping operations.110 Most of the EU’s 
civilian and military crisis management missions so far have taken place in the context of a UN 
operation, while others aimed to prepare or to continue UN engagement. 111  In 2003, for 
example, the EU Police Mission (‘EUPM’) replaced the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(‘UNMIBH’), and, equally in 2003, the EU supported the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (‘MONUC’) through its rapid deployment of ‘Operation Artemis’. Currently, the EU 
supports the International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (‘MISCA’) and the 
African Union’s (‘AU’) mission in Somalia (‘AMISOM’), two peacekeeping missions led by the 
AU with the approval of the UNSC. The UNSC has explicitly recognised the Union’s ‘significant 
contribution’ to international peace and security in a Presidential Statement of 14 February 
2014. 112  The Statement highlights various areas of EU action, both independent and in 
cooperation with the UN. The three mentioned examples of ‘extensive’ EU-UN cooperation 
include the Union’s support of the OPCW/UN Joint Mission for the elimination of the Syrian 
chemical weapons programme, the Union’s role in the Middle East Quartet, and its contribution 
in Afghanistan, in particular through EUPOL Afghanistan and the European Gendarmerie Force 
(‘EGF’). Lastly, the UNSC calls for further strengthening of EU-UN cooperation and invites the 
HR/VP to submit regular briefings to the UNSC. While EU-UN cooperation in the field has thus 
significantly increased over the past decade, room for improvement remains, particularly with 
regard to the planning of mandates, training coordination and the contribution of military 
capabilities.113 Both organisations are currently undertaking steps to address these challenges. 
The EU has adopted a set of priorities aimed at strengthening its partnership with the UN in 
2015114 and is currently preparing a new ‘Global Strategy’.115 On the UN side a High-Level 
Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations was established in October 2014 as part of the 
ongoing review process.116 In its 2015 report, the High-Level Panel recognized the contribution 
of the EU to UN-AU missions and recommended standby arrangements with regional rapid-
response capabilities, namely the European Union Battlegroups. 117 Overall, the partnership 
between the UN and the EU on peacekeeping activities has grown continuously stronger over 
the past years, prompting the UNSG to anticipate an ‘era of “partnership peacekeeping”’.118 
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5. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
There are a number of factors which could turn the EU’s engagement with the UN into a 
success story. These include above all the Union’s reformed institutional external relations 
architecture, which, by creating continuity, holds the potential to considerably increase the 
effectiveness and coherence of EU action within the UN framework. The creation of the posts of 
President of the European Council and HR/VP as well as the establishment of the EEAS not 
only buffer the Union’s external action from the six-monthly changes entailed by the rotation of 
the Council Presidency, they also allow for the creation of an institutional memory and provide 
third countries with the necessary ‘European phone number’. EU Delegations at the various UN 
bodies have successfully assumed their new responsibilities, 119  even though the transition 
period after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty was not without difficulties.120 The fact that 
the coordination in both settings – in Brussels and on the ground – is now largely chaired by 
EEAS officials, may contribute to lessening the often perceived distance between the decision-
makers in the capital and the diplomats in the Delegations.121 An analysis of the Union’s voting 
records in recent UN sessions shows that voting cohesion is generally quite high, thus indicating 
the success of the internal coordination mechanisms. Split votes have become rare and are 
usually limited to very sensitive issues, eg the Israel/Palestine conflict or the use of drones.122 
The realisation that intensive internal coordination should not come at the expense of external 
outreach has prompted a number of EU actors to rethink the coordination process, aiming to 
make it more efficient and to ensure a more strategic planning of EU action in UN fora. 
COHOM, for example, has launched a new practice to hold a meeting with the ambassadors of 
the EU Member States in Geneva in the beginning of each calendar year, in order to formulate 
the Union’s annual priorities in the UN human rights fora and to thus allow for a more 
coordinated and proactive outreach. Apart from these institutional aspects, it is the multilateral 
nature of the EU that might prove to be an advantage in the UN framework after all. Not only do 
the EU’s ‘multiple voices’ come with the benefit of the extensive expertise, capacities and third 
country networks of the 28 Union Member States, but the EU, as a prime example of peace and 
stability through regional integration, may itself serve as a model and leader of successful 
multilateralism.  
This assessment should not, however, distract from the fact that the Union is still far off from 
realising its full potential in the UN and the UN system. One of the main issues is the EU’s 
frequent inability to translate its high degree of voting cohesion into actual impact. A number of 
studies in recent years have demonstrated that the EU often fails to garner sufficient support for 
its initiatives in UN bodies and to prevent initiatives by third countries which run counter to its 
policy preferences.123 Although the Union is frequently in a numerical minority position in the UN 
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setting and therefore has to rely on forming strong cross-regional, coalitions, its capacities are 
still primarily bound by the time-consuming internal coordination process. As a negotiator the 
EU is widely perceived as a slow and inflexible ‘bloc’, which comes to the table with 
painstakingly elaborated and hardly amendable positions. It has also been commented that the 
Union rarely takes strong and confrontational stances, given that it has to represent a 
compromise of 28 views. EU positions tend to aim for the lowest common denominator in order 
to avoid a voting defeat.124 It is possible that these issues will partially be resolved once the 
Union’s post-Lisbon institutional architecture is fully implemented. A number of developments 
indicate that the relevant EU actors are well aware of the problem and are looking for solutions. 
COHOM’s initiative to develop clear priorities covering the entire calendar year and all UN 
human rights bodies is a step in the right direction, allowing, for example, EU Delegations in 
third countries to start lobbying for Union policies well in advance of the respective session. In 
addition, the Commission has addressed the internal negotiation process at the FAO, where the 
mixed membership of the EU and its Member States and the ensuing need to coordinate the 
alternative exercise of membership rights causes an additional burden. In its 2013 
Communication on ‘The role of the European Union in the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO) after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (‘FAO Communication’)125 the Commission proposes a more 
flexible coordination process in which the elaboration of full statements would be the exception, 
and the drafting of ‘lines to take’, the rule. The proposed new ‘Arrangements between the 
Council and the Commission regarding the Exercise of Membership Rights of the European 
Union and its Member States in the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’ 126  (‘FAO 
Arrangements’) are currently under revision in the Council.  
It is the lingering fear of some Member States of a silent ‘competence creep’127 and of a loss of 
standing in international fora that frequently stands in the way of a stronger EU presence at the 
UN. Not only have they often been reluctant to support the Union’s quest for stronger 
participation rights in UN fora,128 they have fought over the use of nameplates,129 the phrasing 
of declarations of competence 130  and the introductory clauses of statements. A prominent 
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example is the United Kingdom’s 2011 blockage of a considerable number of EU statements, in 
the context of a dispute over whether statements on matters of shared EU/Member States 
competences should be delivered ‘on behalf of the EU’ or ‘on behalf of the EU and its Member 
States’.131 While a set of arrangements adopted in October 2011 was able to preliminarily settle 
the conflict, no final solution appears yet to have been found.132 Nevertheless, it is not only an 
internal but also an external lack of support that hinders the Union’s effective participation at the 
UN. Third states have in the past been reluctant to grant the EU participation rights in UN fora, 
based on a mix of concerns about endangering the state-centric system of the UN and the 
principle of sovereign equality of states, as well as on a lack of sufficient knowledge about the 
exact nature and workings of the EU and other regional integration organisations. These 
problems became particularly apparent during the Union’s quest for enhanced participation 
rights in the UNGA,133 but also when the EU tried to obtain negotiation rights with regard to the 
2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.134 
Despite recent attempts to push for a stronger status of the EU in the UN,135 the prospects for 
status upgrades are generally dim. The gap between internal EU competences and external 
participation rights that exists in a number of UN bodies will therefore most likely persist for the 
foreseeable future. 
This has consequences for EU-UN cooperation on the ground. The disconnection between the 
Union’s significant financial contribution and its lack of participation rights at the policy level 
raises the question whether the EU is ‘a payer or a player’ in its relationship with the UN. The 
Union contributes actively to the UN’s work in the areas of development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid, but it only has a modest observer status in the UNDP, the WFP, UNRWA, 
UNFPA, UNICEF and other competent UN bodies. Nevertheless, while a weak status hinders 
the EU from actively shaping the policy formulation in the UN, a strong status is no panacea 
either.136 Even if the EU acquires the strongest participatory rights, its actual impact depends on 
how it fills them with life. For example, in the FAO the EU sought to establish a ‘more policy-
oriented type of cooperation’,137 but commentators disagree on whether there is really a ‘true 
partnership’ between both organisations,138 or whether the FAO sees its cooperation with the 
                                                                                                                                                       
competence under shared competence areas’: United Kingdom, Department for International Development, 
Explanatory Memorandum on COM(2013) 333 final, Doc No 10368-13, 27 June 2013, para 3. 
131  J Borger, ‘EU Anger over British Stance on UN Statements’ (The Guardian, 20 October 2011): 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/20/uk-eu-un-statements-wording, accessed 25 June 2014. 
132 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Statements in Multilateral Organisations – General Arrangements’, Doc No 
15901/11, 24 October 2011; for more detail see C Flaesch-Mougin, ‘Représentation externe et compétences de 
l’Union européenne: quelques réflexions à propos des arrangements généraux du Conseil relatifs aux déclarations de 
l’UE dans les organisations multilatérales’ in C Boutayeb (ed), La Constitution, l’Europe et le droit – Mélanges en 
l’honneur de Jean-Claude Masclet (Paris, Publications de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2013) 571–92. 
133 See above, section II.B.(ii). 
134 For more detail see Wouters, Chané, Odermatt and Ramopoulos (n 11 above). 
135 See eg above, section II.B, the 2012 ‘Strategy for the progressive improvement of the EU status in international 
organisations and other fora in line with the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon’. 
136 See H Bruyninckx, J Wouters, S Basu and S Schunz, ‘The Position(s) of the EU in the UN System: The Examples 
of Human Rights and Environmental Governance’ in H Bruyninckx, J Wouters, S Basu and S Schunz (eds), The 
European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights and 
Environmental Fora (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 253, 267, who conclude that ‘possessing competence 
and a highly developed legal status does not guarantee the EU a central position, while having a low status does not 
exclude it from playing a significant role in or impact on a UN governance process or forum’.  
137 Schild (n 127 above) 223. 
138 JM Pedersen, ‘FAO-EU Cooperation: An Ever Stronger Partnership’ in J Wouters, F Hoffmeister and T Ruys 
(eds), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 
2006) 65. 
23 
 
EU ‘mostly about securing EU funding’.139 The EU should not let itself be relegated to the ‘payer’ 
role but should play an active part in the agenda-setting and strategy development in line with 
its own policy preferences and values. This means not only that the Union must actively seek to 
bring its status in UN bodies in line with its scope of competences and actions, but also that it 
must make the most of those rights that it has been granted.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The EU’s commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ has found expression in an ever stronger 
partnership with the UN. Development cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis management 
are only three of the policy areas where EU-UN cooperation has developed into a stable 
alliance of common objectives and values. Nevertheless, a lot of potential is still lost due to 
inconsistencies between the EU and the UN legal framework, the organisational challenges 
associated with a Union of 28 Member States and fears of both EU and non-EU states about a 
loss of status and influence. The Union’s status in the UN still far too often differs from its actual 
competences. The unwieldy coordination process continues to bind valuable resources on the 
internal front, limiting the EU’s capacity for proactive outreach and coalition-building. Disputes 
over the allocation of powers and external representation reduce the Union’s impact in UN 
bodies by focusing the attention of the involved EU actors often too much on the process rather 
than on the substance. The Lisbon Treaty reforms have provided a number of tools to address 
some of the most pressing issues. It still remains to be seen whether all involved actors – EU 
institutions and Member States alike – will muster the degree of constructive cooperation that is 
necessary for their successful implementation.140 
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